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This  paper  examines  the  role  of  long  standing  institutions  –  identified  through  geography, 
disease  ecology,  colonial  legacy,  and  some  direct  measures  of  political  and  economic 
governance – on human development and its non income components across countries. The 
study employs a novel econometric technique called the Bayesian Model Averaging that allows 
us to select the relevant predictors by experimenting with a host of competing sets of variables. 
It constructs estimates as weighted average of OLS estimates for every possible combination of 
included variables. This is particularly useful in situations when there is model uncertainty and 
theory provides only a weak guidance on the selection of appropriate predictors. Of the 25 
variables  that  we  tried,  three  stand  out  in  terms  of  their  degree  of  importance  and  their 
robustness across various specifications. These include malaria ecology, KKZ index of good 
governance and fertility rate. Our finding on the dominant and robust role of malaria ecology in 
explaining  differences  in  human  development  across  countries,  even  in  the  presence  of 
variables  that  directly  and  indirectly  measure  the  quality  of  institutions,  is  extremely 
fascinating. It shows that malaria ecology has a direct negative impact on human development 
and  this  effect  appears  to  be  over  and  above  its  effect  via  institutions.    Some  of  the  other 
measures of climate and geography as well as those of colonial legacy are important as long as 
we  do  not  control  for  some  direct  measures  of  the  performance  of  political  and  economic 
institutions such as the KKZ index of good governance and democracy score. Once we control 
for these and other conditioning variables such as public spending on health and education; 
fertility rates; and measures of health infrastructure, the importance of geography and colonial 
legacy disappears.        
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1.  Motivation and objectives of the study 
The central motivation of this study is based upon the insights developed from an in-depth 
analysis of the issues and challenges involved in human development in South Asia. In the 
aftermath of trade and market liberalization in the early 1990s, most countries in the South 
Asian region registered unprecedented rates of economic growth that exceeded 9 percent in 
India; 7 percent in Pakistan; 6 percent in Bangladesh and Bhutan; and 5 percent in Bangladesh. 
The benefits of such an impressive economic growth however, do not seem to have translated 
into concomitant improvements in human development indicators. The region continues to host 
the  largest  number  of  poor,  illiterate  and  the  malnourished  people  in  the  world  (see  e.g. 
Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 2007).  
Although,  poverty  rates  in  all  South  Asian  countries  have  declined,  yet  the  rate  of 
reduction  in  poverty  have  not  matched  that  of  economic  growth.  In  fact,  absolute  poverty 
defined in terms of the number of poor, has merely registered 2 percent reduction, on average, 
per annum (from 527 million in 1993 to 423 million in 2004). In spite of overall declines in 
headcount poverty, the global share of South Asia in the total number of poor has increased 
from 40 percent in 1993 to 47 percent in 2004. Its share in the total number of illiterate adults in 
the world has also gone up from 46 to 49 percent during the same period. The enrolment rates 
have improved over the years, yet two countries in the region, India and Pakistan, continue to 
put  up  with  the  highest  numbers  of  out  of  school  children  in  the  world.  Malnutrition, 
particularly  among  children  continues  to  be  a  serious  problem  with  nearly  one  half  of  the 
children under the age of five estimated to be below their weight for age. 
This lackluster performance of South Asia in terms of human development in the presence 
of high economic growth strengthens the view that the benefits of economic growth have been 
unevenly distributed across regions and across various socioeconomic groups within countries. 
The gains have largely been captured by relatively small, educated, urban based elite with the 
result that income inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient went up in almost all South 
Asian countries between 1990 and 1995 (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 2007). 
This scenario gives rise to the following critical question:  If the gains of economic growth are 
not automatically translated into adequate improvements in human development, what are the 
factors that ensure they do?  3 
 
Intuitively, this  takes  us  to  the centrality  of  the  role  of  institutions  and  the  structure  of 
political, economic and civic governance in explaining human development. If Amartya Sen 
(see e.g. Sen 2000) defines human development as the enlargement of choices and opportunities 
available to people and an expansion of their capabilities and freedom, then the achievement of 
this broader goal is hard to envisage without putting people at the centre. Institutions that lack 
transparency, accountability and freedom of speech, and that are weak in terms of enforcing 
property rights and contracts, are bound to promote the interests of a few powerful groups at 
the expense of others. In this sense, low investment in human development, poor social security 
arrangements, fiscal mismanagement and corruption; as well as uneven development and social 
exclusion are all symptoms of a much deeper malaise – succinctly described as the poor quality 
of institutions.   
Most countries of South Asia as well as those in Middle East, and Sub Saharan Africa 
were formerly British, Portuguese, French colonies. The colonial rule left deep imprints on the 
culture as well as the formal and informal values, social norms, rules and regulations. The 
institutions developed by the colonists were largely meant to exploit the local subjects in order 
to promote the colonial interests. As countries gained independence from colonial rule, the key 
features of these institutions remained intact with the replacement of colonists by local elites. 
The exploitative features of these institutions facilitated these local elites to deny masses their 
rights  and continue a  culture  of  political  patronage.  In  the case  of  South  Asia for  instance, 
political and economic power continues to be concentrated amongst a handful of elite groups. 
Dynastic politics and feudalism still thrive even in the presence of democracy, whereas ethnic 
and religious differences continue to be exploited leading to violence and social exclusion.  
 One  may  argue  however,  that  not  all  countries  that  were  former  colonies  have 
performed badly. Countries of Middle East, for instance are comparatively better ranked in 
some areas of human development than their neighboring countries in South Asia and Africa. 
Likewise, some of the highly developed countries such as the U.S.A and Australia were former 
colonies as well. The issue therefore may not be of whether or not a country has been a former 
colony, but whether the institutions developed in the past were exploitative or long lasting. In 
other words, the central question of our interest could be the type and the quality of institutions 
inherited from colonial rulers.  4 
 
The  question  that  arises  then  is  how  to  measure  the  quality  of  institutions  across 
countries. Recent empirical literature has used geographical variables that determine the disease 
environment  to  indicate  the  quality  of  institutions  (see  e.g.  Easterly  and  Levine  2003).  The 
central argument of this stream of literature is that the colonization strategy that the Europeans 
adopted in various countries depended upon the ecological conditions of the region. Countries 
that were located in temperate zones, and away from the equator were less prone to infectious 
diseases and had lower mortality rates. In these countries, Europeans preferred to settle and 
create better and long-lasting institutions that emphasized the protection of property rights and 
a system of checks and balances that are crucial in the effective functioning of governments. On 
the other hand, in countries where the settlers mortality was higher, Europeans did not settle 
but instead created „extractive‟ institutions that promoted political and economic power (see 
Acemoglou  et.  al.  2001  (AJR)  for  more  details).  The  key  assumption  behind  using  these 
historical factors to identify the present day quality of institutions is that the type and quality of 
institutions are persistent and that history and initial conditions have an important role to play 
in shaping the path of development that a country may take.   
In recent years, a number of interesting studies have been conducted to investigate the 
impact of these long standing institutions – identified through geography and colonial legacy - 
on economic growth (see e.g. Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001). These studies employ 
a vast array of variables that capture geography (such as soil quality; distance from equator; 
latitude; and longitude), climatic conditions (such as temperate versus tropical location; and 
mean  temperature)  disease  ecology  (such  as  malaria  ecology);  and  colonial  legacy  (such  as 
whether or not the country has been colonized, the identity of colonizer: French or British, and 
the fraction of the people speaking any of the European languages). 
However, no such study is conducted to investigate the impact of these institutions on a 
broader  and  a  much  more  relevant  indicator  of  human  wellbeing  such  as  the  human 
development. A few studies that have been conducted on the role of institutions and human 
development  (see  next  section  for  a  comprehensive  review)  have  mostly  looked  at  the 
symptomatic  variables  -  such  as  the  absence  or  presence  of  democracy,  civil  and  political 
liberties, government effectiveness, quality of governance, and corruption etc – and not on the 
structural and deeper parameters – such as colonial history and geographic variables – that 
determine the path of subsequent political, civil and economic institutions.  5 
 
The present study uses advanced econometric techniques and a broad range of variables 
that are available to access geographical and ecological conditions; disease environment; and 
colonial  history,  to  investigate  the  role  of  deep  and  structural  factors  -  that  are  relatively 
predetermined and that define the broad contours of the type and quality of institutions – in 
human  development  across  countries.  In  particular,  we  are  interested  in  answering  the 
following questions: 
1.  Does  the  quality  of  long  standing  institutions  -  as  identified  by  colonial  history, 
geography,  climate,  and  disease  ecology -  matter  for  human  development  across 
countries? 
2.  Do  geography,  climate,  and  disease  ecology  have  a  direct  impact  on  human 
development or does this effect merely run via institutions? A number of studies 
have  found  no  direct  impact  of  disease  ecology  and  geographical  location  on 
economic  development  once  institutions  are  controlled  for  (see  e.g.  Easterly  and 
Levine  2002;  and  Acemoglu  and  Johnson  et  al.  2001).  Is  this  true  for  a  broader 
measure of development such as the human development? 
The next section (section 2) presents a comprehensive review of literature. Section 3 discusses 
the  sample  and  the  selection  of  variables  employed  in  the  study.  Section  4  presents  some 
estimation preliminaries and some broad patterns emerging from the data. Section 5 outlines 
the econometric methodology employed and its relevance in providing answers to our research 
questions. Section 6 presents the estimation results and section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Review of Literature 
Institutions as defined by Douglass North (North, 1990) are humanly devised constraints 
that structure human interaction. They include formal institutions such as rules and regulations; 
as well as informal ones such as culture, mentalities, habits, trust, norms, conventions, codes 
and  networks.  Informal  institutions  are  hard  to  capture  although  researchers  have  recently 
attempted  to capture  some  of  these  aspects  under  the broad  category of  “social capital”  or 
“social institutions”. For the purposes of present study, our focus is on formal institutions that 
primarily  fall  under  the  broad  categories  of  economic  and  political  institutions.  Economic 
institutions  include,  but  may  not  be  limited  to  the  following:  rule  of  law;  property  rights; 
contract  enforcement;  regulation  of  market  externalities;  fair  competition;  transparency; 6 
 
accountability; macroeconomic stability that includes fiscal discipline, efficient taxation system 
and low inflation etc); and efficient delivery of public services that includes social welfare; social 
protection; education; health; social infrastructure. Political institutions, in general, encompass 
the type of political regime (such as democracy vs. authoritarianism); political stability and the 
absence of violence; constitutional structures (federalist vs. unitary state); and state capacities 
that include technical as well as administrative capacity of the state. Political institutions are 
complementary to the economic institutions and both are mutually reinforcing. 
The  indicators  classified  above  under  the  broad  categories  of  economic  and  political 
institutions are however performance indicators that capture certain aspects of an institutional 
system. Although these indicators have been used widely in cross section empirical studies 
particularly on economic growth, economists have come to realize the endogeneity of these 
indicators  thereby  limiting  the  precision  and  reliability  of  the  econometric  results  (see  e.g 
Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin, 2000). The idea is that indicators such as corruption and 
bad bureaucracy could very well be the response of poor economic performance. The same 
could very well be true for human development where political instability, violence, corruption, 
and bad bureaucracy may very well be the outcomes of low human development.  The general 
idea  of  the  whole  story  is  that  we  need  a  much  deeper,  structural  and  a  relatively  pre-
determined measure of the quality of institutions. Recently economists have used indicators of 
geography, climate, disease environment and colonial history to identify the quality of long 
standing institutions.   
2.1  From geography to institutions: key theoretical arguments and empirical studies 
As elaborated in section 1 above, geography, ecology, disease environment and colonial history 
have  been  used  in  the  literature  to  identify  the  quality  of  long  standing  institutions.  The 
advantage of using these variables as indirect measures of institutional quality is that they are 
predetermined and are more structural and deep in nature than some of the direct measures of 
political  and  economic  institutions  such  as  the  democracy  and  governance  indicators.  The 
following are the key variables that are used as „deep‟ measures of the quality of institutions:  
2.1.1  Settler Mortality 
This  variable  is  measured  by  the  logarithm  of  annualized  deaths  per  thousand  European 
soldiers during the early 19th century for 72 former colonies. The basic argument behind using 
this variable as a proxy for the quality of long standing institutions is that in regions where 7 
 
settler mortality was high, Europeans did not settle and instead created „extractive‟ institutions 
whereas in countries where settler mortality was low, they settled and created „long-lasting‟ 
institutions. The key assumption behind this view is that European colonists adopted different 
colonization strategies that determined the quality of institutions that persisted even in the post 
independence period (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR), 2001). AJR (2001) argued 
that  post  colonial  governments  of  settler  colonists  were  more  democratic  and  defended 
property rights and rule of law, as compared to colonies where Europeans did not settle. 
Using  these  measures  of  longstanding  institutions,  a  number  of  empirical  studies  have 
found a significant and a robust role of institutions on the level and growth of per capita GDP 
across countries (see e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly 2005; Easterly and Levine, 2003 and 
Acemoglu and Johnson et al., 2003). The data on this measure is however limited and studies 
that  use  several  controls  such  as  the  present  one,  the  sample  size  gets  too  small  for  any 
meaningful results 
2.1.2  Tropical versus temperate climatic zones 
Tropical vs. temperate geographic locations are found to affect development both directly as 
well  as  indirectly  through  institutions.  According  to  Sachs  (2000),  of  the  thirty  economies 
classified  by  the  World  Bank  as  high  income,  only  two:  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong  -  that 
together contribute merely one percent of the population of rich economies - lie in the tropical 
regions. The direct impact of tropical climate on income runs through a number of channels that 
include low productivity of tropical soils; high prevalence of crop pests and parasites; lack of 
applicability  of  ecologically  specific  technologies  developed  in  the  temperate  regions  in  the 
tropics;  and  favorable  conditions  for  infectious  diseases  (see  e.g.  Diamond  1997).  Tropical 
climate  is  also  used  as  an  indirect  measure  of  the  quality  of  institutions  due  to  the  same 
argument  described  above  that  tropical  locations  have  historically  been  prone  to  infectious 
diseases leading to high mortality rates discouraging the European colonists to settle and create 
long lasting institutions. By this argument, tropical regions, in general, have poor quality of 
institutions compared to those of temperate regions 
2.1.3  Land endowments 
This hypothesis, attributed to Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), states that the long run path of 
institutional and economic development is greatly determined by the initial conditions or factor 
endowments. Countries with land endowment that is favorable to the production of those crops 8 
 
- that require economies of scale and the use of slave labor - are historically characterized by the 
concentration of power among the population and landed elites. On the other hand countries 
with the endowment of land favorable to the production of crops such as wheat that can be 
produced by a family farm and does not require economies of scale, are associated with the 
growth  of  a  large  middle  class  in  which  power  is  distributed  more  widely.  Sokoloff  and 
Angerman (2000) argue that the resulting inequality due to differences in these endowments 
has led to the persistence of inequality since elites in these societies developed legal frameworks 
and  rules  that  strengthened  their  power  and  resisted  wider  distribution  and  social  and 
economic  power.  Easterly  and  Levine  (2005)  use  agricultural  endowments  in  the  form  of 
abundance of land for growing wheat relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane to predict 
inequality  and  long-term  economic  development.  Using  this  pre-determined  measure  of 
inequality, Easterly and Levine (2005) find “inequality to be a large and statistically significant 
barrier to prosperity, good quality institutions and high schooling.” 
2.1.4  Disease ecology 
Due to the availability of improved data on disease ecology particularly malaria, there has been 
a renewed interest in investigating the impact of malaria ecology on economic development. 
Jeffrey  Sachs  of  the  Earth  Institute,  Colombia  is  a  prominent  advocate  of  the  direct  role  of 
malaria in economic development (see e.g. Sachs 2003). He argues that 41 out of the 44 countries 
with severe malaria lie in the bottom half of global ranking of countries with respect to GDP per 
capita. Economic growth in these countries has been dismal. Sachs argues that countries that 
have been able to eradicate malaria in past century have been able to grow much faster than 
growth in their region.  He identifies a number of channels through which the prevalence of 
malaria  has  a  direct  effect  on  economic  development.  These  include  reduction  in  workers‟ 
productivity; increase in absenteeism both among teachers and students; premature mortality 
and  increase  in  medical  costs.  According  to  Sachs,  malaria  consumes  up  to  25  percent  of 
household income and 40 percent of the government health spending in Africa. 
Acemoglu and Johnson et al. (2003), on the other hand argue that disease ecology do not 
have a direct effect on economic development. The only effect that they may have is through 
institutions.  Long lasting institutions that protect property rights and are favorable to economic 
and social development are developed by colonists in those regions that had favorable disease 
ecology with low settler mortality. On the other hand, regions where disease ecology was prone 9 
 
to malaria and yellow fever was fatal for European and in these regions, Europeans developed 
„extractive‟  institutions  resulting  in  the  concentration  of  political  and  economic  power.  
Acemoglu and Johnson  et  al. (2003)  argue  that  some  studies  that explore  the  direct  role  of 
malaria have an omitted variable bias because malaria prevalence is correlated with European 
settlement and colonization strategies.  
2.2 Institutions and Human Development: Empirical Studies 
As mentioned in section 1 above, we do not find any study that looks at the role of any of the 
structural  and  deep  measures  of  the  quality  of  institutions  on  human  development. 
Interestingly, we came across quite a few studies that examined the impact of democracy on 
child mortality rates and a few studies that primarily examined the impact of corruption and 
bad governance on some selected indicators such as child mortality, drop-out rates and public 
expenditure on health and education. These studies are briefly reviewed below:   
2.2.1   Political institutions and human development  
Political institutions have an instrumental significance in the formulation and implementation 
of public policies pertaining to the distribution of resources and the provision of public services 
such as health and education. Sen (2000), for instance, argues that participatory democracy that 
encourages public debate and discussion as well as civil and political rights has a constructive 
role in both the formation of values, norms and preferences as well as their translation into 
policies that benefit the society. 
A number of cross country empirical studies have examined the role of political institutions 
in human development or its non income components (particularly infant and child mortality). 
Majority of these studies have looked at the type of political regime as a measure of the political 
institutions. Volmer and Ziegler (2009) for instance conducted a panel analysis corresponding to 
1970-2003 and examined the relationship between democracy and the non income components 
of human development and found that democracy has a positive impact on life expectancy and 
literacy rates even after controlling for GDP. Several  other empirical studies, mostly in the 
realm of political science, have found a significant positive effect -  that is independent of the 
level of development  - on  child health outcomes (see e.g. Zweifel and Navia, 2000; Przeworski 
et  al  ,2000;  Lake  and  Baum,  2001;  Bueno  de  Mesquita,  2004;  Besley  and  Kudamatsu,  2006; 
Franco and Ruiz, 2004; Tsai 2006; Ross, 2006).  10 
 
A  number  of  convincing  arguments  have  been  made  in  the  literature  regarding  the 
mechanisms through which democracy is expected to promote greater human development. 
First, it is argued that in democracies the median voter is the decisive voter and in unequal 
societies, the income of the median voter is way below the mean income. The median voter 
collectively  forces  the  government  to  redistribute  income  in  favor  of  the  poor  (see  e.g. 
Volmer  and  Ziegler,  2009).  It  is  therefore  argued  that  democracy  tends  to  improve  the 
distribution of a country‟s resources (see Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Boix, 2003; Mulligan 
and Sala-i-Martin. 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;) and thereby fosters the wellbeing of 
the  great  majority  of  the  population.  Second,  it  is  argued  that  since  democracies  are 
accountable  to  the  people  for  their  political  survival,  they  have  a  greater  tendency  to 
address to the needs of the poor and to provide them with a wide array of opportunities. 
They  promote  higher  manufacturing  wages  (Rodrik  1999),  higher  investment  in  human 
capital (Baum and Lake 2003; Stasavage 2005; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Avelino and 
Hunter  2005),  and  a  higher  social  welfare  (Dasgupta  1993).  Amartya  Sen‟s  famous 
contention  that  famines  rarely  occur  in  democracies  (Sen  2000),  is  itself  a  convincing 
argument for the instrumental role of democracy in human development.  
Despite these theoretical arguments and the plethora of empirical studies establishing a 
positive  relationship  between  democracy  and  child  mortality,  there  is  still  a  lack  of 
consensus on this issue. Ross (2006) for instance is highly critical of the studies that establish 
a positive link between democracy and child health outcomes. He argues that most of these 
studies do not control for country specific factors. There could be a possibility of some third 
factor  that  drives  both  the  reduction  in  infant  mortality  and  the  greater  prevalence  of 
democracy.  He  argues  further  that  reduction  in  mortality  rates  over  time,  due  to 
technological advancements in public health, almost coincides with a dramatic rise in the 
prevalence of democracy. So there could be an „exogenous health trend‟ that the existing 
studies fail to take into account.  Ross (2006) also argues that most of these cross section 
studies suffer from selection bias as the majority of countries that have dictatorships may 
not have the required data. The study further contends that the poor on average may not be 
concerned about civil and political rights if it does not improve their material wellbeing. 
Democracies  are  not  immune  to  elite  capture  of  public  resources.  They  may  promote 
inequitable distribution of public resources whereby the benefits of public expenditure on 11 
 
public  services  are  captured  more  by  the  upper  income  groups  than  the  lower  income 
groups. 
The subject of the link between democracy and human development therefore is still 
open  for  further  work.  Some  of  the  limitations  of  earlier  studies  can  be  addressed  by 
including sufficient control variables and by taking the discussion beyond the presence or 
absence  of  democracy  to  the  quality  and  maturity  of  democracy  and  the  technical  and 
administrative  capacity  of  the  governments.  The  presence  of  democracy  alone  may  not 
guarantee  greater  human  development  unless  it  is  accompanied  by  strong  democratic 
values and culture that includes civil and political liberties; a vibrant civil society that raises 
its voice effectively to get justice for the poor; a vocal and independent media that acts as a 
watch dog; effective mechanisms to hold governments accountable to the people such as an 
independent judiciary; and an electoral system that guarantees free and fair elections. 
 2.2.2  Corruption and human development 
Corruption, broadly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, is found to have 
a  negative  impact  on  human  development  through  several  ways.  It  reduces  economic 
growth and the pace of poverty reduction. It increases military expenditures (see e.g. Gupta, 
and Sharan et. al., 2001) and has a negative impact on resources allocated for health and 
education (Mauro, 1998). It leads to leakages in public resources, including those that are 
allocated for health and education, and leads to an inefficient and inequitable allocation of 
these resources. Corruption is also found to be the primary factor behind low quality of 
education and health services. Cross country empirical studies have found that corruption 
has a negative impact on health and education indicators as measured by child mortality 
and immunization coverage on the one hand and literacy rate, school enrolment and drop-
out rates on the other hand.  Gupta and Davoodi et.al. (2000) for instance, conducted a cross 
section  analysis  of  128  countries  for  the  period  1985-97  and  found  that  corruption  has 
adverse consequences on child mortality, percentage of low birth babies and drop outs in 
primary schools. In particular, the study found that child mortality rates in countries with 
high  corruption  are  about  one  third  higher  than  countries  with  low  corruption.  Infant 
mortality and percentage of low birth weight babies are twice as high; whereas drop-out 
rates are five times as high. Corruption is also found to be a contributing factor in fostering 12 
 
educational, income and asset inequality (see e.g. Gupta and Davoodi  et al., 1998) thereby 
exacerbating poverty. 
Similarly,  Akcay  (2006)  employed  three  different  indices  of  corruption  (Corruption 
Perception  Index  by  Transparency  International;  International  Country  Risk  Guide  by 
Political Risk Services; and Corruption Index compiled by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003)),  conducted  a  cross  country  analysis  of  63  countries  and  found  a  statistically 
significant negative relationship between corruption and human development. Corruption 
is  inevitably  a  symptom  of  poor  political  and  economic institution.  Shleifer  and  Vishny 
(1993)  suggest  that  government  institutions  and  political  process  are  a  very  important 
determinant of the level of corruption. 
2.2.3  Good governance and human development 
Studies on the role of good governance in human development have mostly examined 
the role of good governance in translating public expenditures on health and education in 
an  efficient  and  equitable  manner.  Empirical  studies  have  found  a  weak  relationship 
between  public  expenditures  and  health  outcomes  implying  that  the  governments  on 
average are not efficient in terms of translating public expenditures into effective services 
(see e.g  Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Filmer et al. 2000; Kim and Moody 1992; Musgrove 1996; 
Pritchett and Summers 1996). These studies further reinforce the argument that it is not 
merely fiscal outlays for health and education but the efficient, equitable and transparent 
utilization  of  these  resources  that  matter  for  improvement  in  human  development 
outcomes. 
 
3.  Sample and Variables  
We conduct estimations for both the Human Development Index (HDI) as well as its non 
income components: the life expectancy and the combined gross enrolment rates. We do not 
use adult literacy rate as the available data on this variable is not adequate and after the 
inclusion of all control variables, our sample size is reduced further. We assume that the 
combined gross enrolment rate serves as a good proxy of educational attainment. For HDI 
as our dependent variable, our basic sample  (sample A)  consists of 72 countries, out of 
which 51 are developing countries. This sample is reduced further when we include data on 
income inequality. We include these two variables in a sub sample (sample B) that consists 13 
 
of 58 countries, out of which 38 are developing countries. We report results for both these 
samples. For life expectancy as our dependent variable, the sample consists of 78 countries, 
out of which 57 are developing countries. For combined gross enrolment rates, we have a 
sample size of 66 countries, out of which 48 are developing countries.  
Our dependent variable is the Human Development Index (2005) labeled as hdi reported 
in the Global Human Development Report prepared by UNDP (UNDP, 2009). This 2005 
index  is  averaged  over  the  five  year  period  from  2000  to  2005  using  a  consistent 
methodology. We also report results on two other models in which we are interested in 
examining the determinants of non income components of the Human Development Index. 
The dependent variables in these models are the Life Expectancy (lie) and the Combined 
Gross Enrolment Ratios (ger), both taken from UNDP (2009). 
In terms of potential explanatory variables, we first focus on variables that are either 
predetermined or exogenous or those that evolve slowly over time. To start with, we first 
estimate the impact of some key variables related to geography and climate. We also include 
some regional dummies in our initial set of estimations. To capture the role of geography, 
we  make  use  of  a well-known  ecozone  classification  systems  of  the  tropics,  namely  the 
Koeppen-Geiger  (KG)  zones.  The  variable  of  our  interest  is  the  share  of  a  country‟s 
population  that  lives  in  a  Koeppen-Geiger  temperate  zone  (kgptemp).  This  classification 
defines  climatic  boundaries  based  on  vegetation  types,  temperature,  and  precipitation.  
Other researchers have also used zero one dummy for tropical location as well as variables 
that measure latitude and longitude. However, as pointed out by Sach‟s (2000), tropical or 
temperate  ecozones  are  a  rough  characterization  of  a  country‟s  relevant  ecological 
characteristics and a more useful definition of tropics should be based on ecological and 
climatic characteristics rather than the geographical characteristics. In this sense kgptemp is a 
superior  measure  as  it  classifies  countries  on  the  basis  of  both  temperature  as  well  as 
precipitation.  We  also  use  mean  temperature  (meantemp)  as  an  additional  measure  of 
climate. 
To  measure  disease  ecology,  we  utilize  the  Malaria  Ecology  Index  (me)  –  a 
comprehensive index constructed by Kiszewski and Sachs et al. (2004) that measures the 
intensity of malaria transmission based upon the biological characteristics of mosquitoes 
and the ecological conditions.  14 
 
To access the role of colonial legacy, we use a number of measures that include colonial 
dummy on whether or not a country had ever been colonized (colever); the fraction of people 
speaking  any  of  the  major  European  languages  (eurfrac).  We  also  use  the  dummy  for 
colonizer‟s identity. Since majority of the countries that were colonized in the past were 
either French or British colonies, we use legbritish (a dummy for whether or not a country 
was a British colony) and legfrench (a dummy for whether or not a country was a French 
colony).   
We also make use of some well known and widely used measures of good governance 
and political institutions. To access the role of governance, we use a broad index of the 
quality of governance constructed by Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi (2005). The index is 
formed  by  averaging  across  six  measures  of  1)  Voice  and  Accountability  (measuring 
political and civil rights); 2) Political stability and the Absence of Violence; 3) Government 
Effectiveness (measuring the competence of bureaucracy and the quality of bureaucracy); 4) 
Regulatory Burden (measuring the incidence of market unfriendly policies); 5) Rule of Law 
and 6) Control of Corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2005). This index is referred to as the KKZ 
index (avgkkz).  A higher value of the index corresponds to high quality governance. For 
political institutions, we make use of the dataset compiled by Polity IV Project of the Center 
for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. We 
use the Polity2 (polity2) score from this dataset that ranges from 10 (highly democratic) to -
10  (highly  autocratic).  We  also  experiment  with  some  other  structural  parameters  that 
includes the measure of ethnic fractionalization (ethnifrac) and obtained from Alesina et al. 
(2003). The index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a 
population belonged to different ethnic groups. Its theoretical maximum is reached at the 
value of one when each person belongs to a different group. Empirical studies have shown 
that  ethnic  and  linguistic  fractionalization  is  associated  with  inferior  government 
performance. La Porte (1999) for instance finds that government performance, measured by 
a variety of variables including the quality of public goods such as health, education and 
infrastructure,  is  relatively  poor  in  ethno-linguistic  heterogeneous  societies.  The  central 
theoretical argument is that in more ethnically heterogeneous societies, the ruling group has 
a tendency to limit the provision of public goods and restrict the other minority groups to 
benefit and get powerful. They also tend to restrict the freedom of opposition. Easterly and 15 
 
Levine (2009) attribute much of the Africa‟s growth tragedy – reflected in negative growth, 
poor  schooling,  political  instability,  under  developed  financial  systems  and    high 
government revenues – to Africa‟s high level of ethnic fragmentation. Easterly and Levine 
argue that a large part of differences in public policies, political instability and other factors 
associated with long term economic growth  can be explained by cross country differences 
in ethnic diversity.  
Other variables include the growth rate of Real GDP per capita in $PPP (pengryc) for 
2005 obtained from Penn World tables. Since the level of GDP per capita is included in HDI 
by construction, we do not use it.  To measure income inequality, we make use of the much 
superior data set on income inequality recently made available by Easterly (2005) in which 
data is adjusted by taking the average of each country of estimates from all sources over the 
period  1960-1998  (giniadj).  This  reduces  the  measurement  error  associated  with  income 
inequality data and serves as a good measure of initial inequality for the purposes of our 
study. We also use public spending on health as percentage of GDP (hlthexp) and public 
spending  on  education  as  percentage  of  GDP  (eduexp)  both  obtained  from  World 
Development indicators by the World Bank. We take data lagged by five years on these two 
indicators so as to reduce the problem of reverse causality and to allow for the time lag 
required  to  translate  public  health  and  education  expenditures  into  outcomes.  Other 
conditioning variables that we use are immunization rates against DPT (imdpt); the number 
of physicians per 1,000 population (physc), fertility rate (frtrt); the incidence of Tuberculoses 
per 100,000 population (intub) and the urbanization rate that is simply the growth rate of 
urban population (urbnpopg) all obtained from the World Bank data source. 
   
4.  Some Estimation Preliminaries 
The scatter plots presented in Appendix 1 show some clear patterns emerging from the 
data. Among the variables related to geography and climate, malaria ecology and mean 
temperature seem to have a clear negative association with the Human Development Index 
(HDI).  In  particular,  the  slope  of  the  fitted  line  between  malaria  ecology  and  human 
development is visibly steep. Interestingly, the association between human development 
and all components of good governance is clearly positive. Growth rate of real GDP per 
capita seems to have a very weak association with the HDI. Among other variables, fertility 16 
 
rate  and  urbanization  rate  seem  to  be  closely  and  negatively  related  to  HDI.  Policy 
variables such as public spending on health and health infrastructure, such as the number 
of  physicians  and  immunization  rates,  are  positively  associated  with  HDI  variables  as 
expected.  With  regards  to  the  Gini  coefficient  of  income  inequality,  there  is  a  negative 
pattern  of  association  between  the  measures  of  inequality  and  human  development 
emerging from  the  scatter  plots. However,  the scatter  points  do  not  seem  to  be tightly 
clustered across the fitted line and so the relationship appears to be rather weak. A negative 
association is also visible between HDI and ethnic fractionalization. 
 
5.  The Econometric Methodology 
In  order  to  test  the  relevance  of  a  host  of  competing  variables  in  explaining 
human development across countries, we will employ a novel econometric technique 
called  the     Bayesian Model Averaging  (BMA)  or  Bayesian Averaging  of  Classical 
Estimates (BACE). The reason for choosing Bayesian methods is that empirical research 
on human development, particularly in a cross country perspective is negligible. There 
are  many  candidate  predictors,  and  theory  provides  only  weak  guidance  on  the 
specification of the regression. In other words, there is uncertainty regarding the choice 
of an appropriate model. Model uncertainty is a fundamental problem for empirical 
research in social science and the traditional response to this problem is to downplay it, 
select a set of suitable predictors and a single model and then base inferences on the 
basis of this model. The drawback of this approach is that it ignores model uncertainty. 
Ignoring model uncertainty lead to the impairment of predictive performance of the 
model and leads to overstatement of the strength of evidence via p-values that are too 
small (see Hoeting et al, 1999). The Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) gets 
around  with  this  problem  by  constructing  estimates  as  weighted  average  of  OLS 
estimates  for  every  possible  combination  of  included  variables.  For  instance,  if  we 
restrict ourselves to linear regression models with explanatory variables drawn from a 
set  of  p  predictors,  where  p  is  less  than  the  number  of  countries,  then  there  are  2P 
possible models that can be estimated including the null model with only an intercept. 
The  Bayesian  methods  estimate  every  possible  model  with  different  combination  of 
predictors and then report the posterior probability of inclusion of different explanatory 17 
 
variables  in  order  of  their  importance.  A  higher  inclusion  probability  of  a  variable 
indicates the higher importance of that variable in explaining the dependent variable. 
For instance, if Θ is the model parameter, then the posterior distribution of Θ is given 
by: 
 
 𝑝 Θ Ζ  =   𝑝 Θ Ζ,Μk 𝑝 Μk Ζ , Κ
k=1  
 
Where M= (M1, M2, …., Mk) is the set of models under consideration and Z is the given 
data. The estimation of posterior distribution is based upon the Bayesian Information 
Criteron (BIC). In order to investigate the hypothesis that a slope coefficient βz ≠0, we 
sum up the posterior model probabilities for all models in which βz ≠0. Similarly, we 
can also assess the weight of evidence that a coefficient is strictly positive by summing 
up the posterior model probabilities for all models in which βz>0. 
The advantage of using Bayesian methods is that it guides us in the selection of 
predictors and the appropriate model. It allows us to include and try an exhaustive set 
of predictors, a luxury that the Ordinary Least Squares does not allow as it runs into the 
risk  of  losing  the  precision  of  the  model  (through  the  reduction  in  the  degree  of 
freedom). It also allows us to examine robustness of variables across a wide range of 
specifications. Recent advances in computing power have made a Bayesian approach 
increasingly  easy  to  adopt.  Our  study  is  the  first  to  apply  these  methods  to  the 
examination of factors affecting human development across countries. 
 
6.  Estimation Results  
6.1  Results from the Bayesian Approach 
As mentioned in section 3 above, we have four different samples: The first two samples 
(one with income inequality and the other without) are used to examine factors that the 
affect the Human Development Index (HDI) across countries. The dependent variable in 
this specification is therefore the HDI. The other two samples are obtained to repeat the 
estimations to examine the determinants of non income components of HDI: the life 
expectancy  and  the  combined  gross  enrolment  rates.  Using  the  methods  describe  in 
section 5, we compute posterior probabilities of inclusion of a variable, namely the sum 
of posterior model probabilities for all models in which a variable appears. We also 18 
 
provide  some  indication  of  the  sign  of  a  relationship,  based  on  the  total  posterior 
probability for models in which a variable acts in a given direction. 
The estimation results are reported in Appendix 4. We start off with some fixed 
or  exogenous  factors  such  as  the  geographic  location,  climate,  disease  ecology  and 
colonial history. These results are reported in column 1 of each table. In the next column, 
we  include  the  remaining  variables  such  as  some  direct  measures  of  institutions 
(Governance Index; and democracy score from Polity2); policy variables (such as public 
spending on health and education; and health infrastructure); and other conditioning 
variables (such as growth of GDP per capita; initial income inequality; fertility rates and 
growth of urban population etc.)  
Let us first examine the results for HDI.  Starting off with some fixed factors such 
as  regional  location,  percentage  of  population  living  in  temperate  zones,  mean 
temperature,  and  malaria  ecology,  we  find  that  percentage  of  population  living  in 
temperate zones (kgptemp) receives a very high posterior inclusion probability of 0.94. 
The  positive  sign  indicates  that  HDI  is  higher  on  average  for  population  living  in 
temperate regions. Among the regional dummies, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asian 
dummy receive the highest posterior inclusion probabilities of 1.0. The negative sign 
indicates unsurprisingly that HDI is poorer for people living in South Asia and Sub 
Saharan  Africa.  Western  Europe  has  posterior  inclusion  probabilities  of  0.83  with  a 
positive sign. British colony also receives a very high posterior inclusion probability of 
0.90  percent.  The  sign  is  positive  indicating  that  HDI  is  positively  associated  with 
countries  that  have  been  British  colonies  in  the  past.  Malaria  ecology  receives  the 
posterior inclusion probability of 0.26 with a negative predicted sign indicating the HDI 
is negatively associated with malaria prone regions.  
In the next column, when we add some direct measures of institution such as the 
KKZ Governance Index, Polity2 and other conditioning variables, interestingly, we find 
that the importance of climate and colonial legacy variables drops drastically with none 
of  these  variables  receiving  more  than  0.14  of  posterior  inclusion  probability.  This 
indicates that geography, climate and colonial legacy affect HDI only though institutions 
and  not  directly.  The  most  important  variables,  in  order  of  their  posterior  inclusion 
probability  turn  out  to  be  fertility  rate  (1.0),  South  Asia  dummy  (1.0)  developing 19 
 
countries dummy (1.0), malaria ecology (0.98), KKZ index of good governance (0.77) and 
Sub Saharan Africa dummy (0.68).  
Of particular interest is the high posterior inclusion probability (with a negative 
predicted sign) of malaria ecology. This is despite the fact that we controlled for both 
direct as well as indirect measures of the quality of institutions. This vindicates Sach‟s 
(2003) contention that malaria has a direct role in development as opposed to Acemoglu 
and Johnson et al. (2003) who contend that malaria affects development only through 
institutions  and  not  directly.  Nevertheless,  our  variable  of  interest  is  the  human 
development and not economic development per say as in Acemoglu and Johnson et al. 
(2003). This result is quite fascinating because the importance of malaria ecology does 
not  decline  (in  fact  increase  further)  in  all  our  samples  even  when  we  use  gross 
enrolment rates and life expectancy as the dependent variables. It does not receive the 
posterior inclusion probability of less than 0.98 in all the samples and in the presence of 
all controls.  
The results do not change much with the inclusion of initial income inequality 
except  for  the  fact  that  in  addition  to  KKZ  index  of  good  governance,  Polity2  also 
receives a high posterior inclusion probability of 0.78 in this sample. The predicted sign 
is  positive  indicating  that  democracy  score  is  positively  associated  with  human 
development across countries. Fertility rate and malaria ecology both receive posterior 
inclusion  probabilities  of  1.0.  Initial  income  inequality  receives  posterior  inclusion 
probability of 0.12 and the predicted sign turns out to be indeterminate. 
Next, let us examine the results for our life expectancy equation (table 4.3). We 
have slightly modified the equation by dropping some irrelevant explanatory variables 
such as public spending on education and including other relevant variables such as the 
incidence of disease such as the Tuberculosis. Moreover, we also control for the level of 
real GDP per capita. According to the estimation results, the most important variables in 
degree of their posterior inclusion probabilities are the disease prevalence as proxied by 
the incidence of Tuberculosis (1.0), fertility rate (1.0), real GDP per capita (1.0), malaria 
ecology (1.0), East Asia and Pacific (0.94), French colony (0.98), and Sub Saharan Africa 
(0.97).  Interestingly,  the  predicted  sign  for  French  colony  turns  out  to  be  positive 
implying that countries that have been French colonies in the past seem to have higher 20 
 
life expectancies on average. The other variables have predicted signs as expected.  The 
KKZ index of good governance however loses its importance in the presence of real 
GDP per capita.  
When  we  take  gross  enrolment  ratio  as  our  dependent  variable,  we  include 
undernourishment rate and real GDP per capita as our additional controls. We drop 
public spending on health. The results, reported in table 4.4, are similar in many ways to 
the ones we obtained above. Malaria ecology again receives one of the highest posterior 
inclusion probability of 1.0. The other important variables, in degree of their posterior 
inclusion probability, are percentage of population living in temperate regions (0.99) 
democracy  score  as  measured  by  Polity2  (0.98)  East  Asia  and  Pacific  (0.95),  Latin 
America and Caribbean (0.95); real GDP per capita (0.93); immunization against DPT 
(0.93); and public spending on education as % of GDP (0.36).   The predicted signs for all 
these variables are as expected. Notice that when we control for GDP per capita, the 
importance of KKZ index of governance disappears. The results for gross enrolment 
ratios turn out to be a little different from the HDI and the life expectancy specifications 
in the sense that temperate location now receives a high inclusion probability, even in 
the  presence  of  all  controls,  and  the  predicted  sign  is  positive  implying  that  gross 
enrolment rates are on average higher in temperate locations. Immunization rate also 
receives  a  reasonably  high  inclusion  probability  and  the  predicted  sign  is  positive. 
Public spending on education also seems to matter a lot with higher spending associated 
with higher gross enrolment rates. 
 
  6.2  OLS Results 
Bayesian methods are useful in terms of providing guidance in the selection of variables 
that  have  a  high  predictive  power  across  an  exhaustive  set  of  model  specifications. 
However, it does not help us predict the size of the impact of independent variables on 
dependent variables. In order to get some insight on the significance and size of the 
impact of independent variables on dependent variable, we conduct OLS estimations.  
The selection of the variables is based upon the posterior inclusion probabilities that 
they received in BMA results described in section 6.1. We select only those variables for 21 
 
our OLS estimations that receive a relatively high posterior inclusion probability (greater 
than 0.2). 
As in the case of BMA, we use four different samples (two for HDI as the dependent 
variable, one for life expectancy and one for gross enrolment ratio as the dependent 
variable. Before we present the OLS results, it is important to mention some caveats. 
First, since model selection is involved, therefore there might be a selection bias in the 
coefficient  estimates.  Moreover,  since  many  of  our  explanatory  variables  are  closely 
related to each other, it may not be straight forward to disentangle the effect of one 
variable  from  another.  For  instance,  the  KKZ  index  of  good  governance  is  highly 
correlated with real GDP per capita (partial correlation coefficient turns out to be 0.88). 
So in specifications where we cannot use GDP per capita as the explanatory variable 
(such  as  in  the HDI  equation), KKZ index  may  very  well be  picking up  the  role  of 
income.  For this purpose, the OLS results need to be interpreted with caution. 
Table  4.3-4.5  present  the  OLS  results  across  different  specifications.  As  we  can  see 
clearly,  the  OLS  results  broadly  support  the  insights  we  gained  from  our  BMA 
estimations.  The  coefficient  of  malaria  ecology  is  highly  significant  across  all  the 
specifications  even  after  controlling  for  regional  dummies,  geography  variable 
(percentage of population living in temperate zones) as well as governance and policy 
variables. The predicted sign is negative indicating that countries that have a high value 
of Malaria Ecology Index (countries that are more prone to malaria) have low human 
development. Notice that the size of the impact of malaria ecology (as depicted by the 
value  of  the  coefficient  estimate)  is  relatively  small  for  HDI  as  compared  to  life 
expectancy and gross enrolment ratios. A one percent increase in Malaria Ecology Index 
for instance would lead to a reduction in HDI index by 0.03 percent on average, whereas 
the same increase in Malaria Ecology index would lead to a 1.3 percent reduction in life 
expectancy  and  3.5  percent  reduction  in  gross  enrolment  ratios.  The  coefficient  of 
governance  index  is  also  significant  and  positive  in  majority  of  the  specifications. 
However, once we control for the level of real GDP per capita, its impact dies out and 
the coefficient estimate is no longer significant. Fertility rate has a negative and a highly 
significant impact on both Human Development Index as well as life expectancy. It loses 
its statistical significance however in explaining gross enrolment ratios. It is interesting 22 
 
to note that democracy score (Polity2) is highly significant in explaining gross enrolment 
ratios.  The  sign  is  positive  implying  that  higher  democracy  is  good  for  improving 
education across countries. Notice that real GDP per capita does not have a statistically 
significant impact on gross enrolment ratios whereas immunization rates have a positive 
and  a  statistically  significant  impact  on  gross  enrolment  ratios.  As  in  BMA  results, 
percentage of population living in KG temperate zones has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on gross enrolment ratios even after controlling for the level of GDP 
per capita and governance.           
 
7.  Conclusion 
In  recent  years,  a  number  of  interesting  studies  have  been  conducted  to 
investigate  the  impact  of  long  standing  institutions  –  identified  through  geography, 
disease ecology and colonial legacy - on economic growth or the level of GDP per capita. 
However,  no  such  empirical  study  is  conducted  to  investigate  the  impact  of  these 
institutions on a broader and a much more relevant indicator of human wellbeing such 
as the human development. This study aims to fill this critical gap by investigating the 
role of geography, institutions and disease ecology on human development and its non 
income  components  across  countries.  The  study  employs  a  comprehensive  set  of 
variables on geography, climate, disease ecology and some direct measures of political 
and economic institutions and uses a novel econometric technique called the Bayesian 
Model  Averaging  to  study  the  role  of  each  of  these  variables  in  affecting  human 
development  across  countries.  This  econometric  approach  constructs  estimates  as 
weighted average of OLS estimates for every possible combination of included variables. 
Based upon this method, it computes posterior probabilities of inclusion, namely the 
sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which a variable appears.  A 
higher  posterior  inclusion  probability  of  a  variable  indicates  the  higher  degree  of 
importance  of  that  variable  in  explaining  the  dependent  variable.  The  method  also 
provides  some  indication  of  the  sign  of  a  relationship,  based  on  the  total  posterior 
probability for models in which a variable acts in a given direction. The advantage of 
using this approach is that it takes into account model uncertainty particularly when 
theory provides only weak guidance on the selection of relevant variables. It also allows 23 
 
us to include and try an exhaustive set of predictors, a luxury that a straight forward 
estimation of Ordinary Least Squares does not provide without running into the risk of 
losing the precision of the estimates. 
We  used  three  different  specifications,  each  including  a  different  measure  of 
human development as the dependent variable. More specifically, we used the Human 
Development  Index  (HDI)  and  its  non  income  components  of  life  expectancy  and 
combined  gross  enrolment  rates  as  the  dependent  variable  in  each  of  these 
specifications. Out of an average of 25 variables that we tried for each equation, three 
variables  stand  out  in  terms  of  their  importance  and  robustness  in  explaining  both 
human  development  as  well  as  its  non-income  components  across  countries.  These 
include  malaria  ecology,  KKZ  index  of  good  governance  and  fertility  rate.  Malaria 
ecology  receives  one  of  the  highest  posterior  inclusion  probabilities  and  this  is  true 
across  all  specifications  of  human  development  and  in  the  presence  of  all  controls 
including some direct as well as indirect measures of the quality of institutions. This 
indicates that malaria ecology has a direct negative impact on human development and 
this effect is over and above its effect on the quality of institutions. This turns out to be 
one of the most fascinating findings of our study. 
Other  geographic  and  climatic  variables,  particularly  the  percentage  of 
population living in KG temperate zone are important as long as we do not control for 
some  direct  measures  of  the  quality  of  institutions  such  as  the  KKZ  index  of  good 
governance and democracy score; policy variables such the public spending on health 
and education; and other conditioning variables such as the fertility rate, immunization 
coverage and growth in urbanization etc. As soon as we control for these variables, the 
importance  of  geography  and  climate  disappears.  Same  is  true  for  colonial  legacy. 
British and French legacy as well as fraction of population speaking any of the European 
languages turn out to be important initially. However once we control for the direct 
measures of the performance of economic and political institutions, colonial legacy does 
not matter anymore. 
   The  KKZ  index  of  good  governance  is  positively  associated  with  the  human 
development. This index measures various aspects of the performance of political and 
economic  institutions.  It  is  the  average  of  six  indices  namely  :1)  Voice  and 24 
 
Accountability  (measuring  political  and  civil  rights);  2)  Political  stability  and  the 
Absence  of  Violence;  3)  Government  Effectiveness  (measuring  the  competence  of 
bureaucracy  and  the  quality  of  bureaucracy);  4)  Regulatory  Burden  (measuring  the 
incidence of market unfriendly policies); 5) Rule of Law and 6) Control of Corruption. 
The  significance  of  these  measures  of  political  and  economic  governance  has  been 
pointed out earlier in some studies, particularly in a number of global, regional and 
national Human Development Reports prepared by the UNDP, yet to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that points to the direct empirical relationship between 
human  development  and  good  governance.  The  importance  of  KKZ  index  of  good 
governance is however not robust to the inclusion of real GDP per capita. This implies 
that good governance index may very well be capturing the role of real GDP per capita 
in explaining life expectancy and gross enrolment ratios across countries.  The finding 
that  fertility  rate  is  closely  and  negatively  associated  with  the  human  development 
across countries is also an extremely useful finding from a policy perspective. 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 
Variable  Obs  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  Max 
hdi  169  0.73  0.18  0.33  0.968 
kgptemp  104  0.30  0.42  0  1 
meantemp  101  19.94  7.73  -0.2  29.3 
lwheatsugar  112  0.11  0.21  -0.39  0.58 
eurfrac  101  0.25  0.40  0  1.004 
colever  104  0.44  0.50  0  1 
legbritish  162  0.35  0.48  0  1 
legfrench  160  0.44  0.50  0  1 
me  102  4.67  7.63  0  31.5479 
avgkkz  157  -0.06  0.90  -1.77  1.94 
polity2  147  3.91  6.42  -10  10 
pengryc  169  2.90  3.50  -4.98  22.74 
giniadj  119  42.27  9.01  23.97  67.46 
ethnifrac  166  0.44  0.26  0  0.9302 
hlthexp  167  3.34  1.82  0.09  8.21 
eduexp  141  4.44  1.80  1.23  11.67 
imdpt  168  84.62  15.91  21.8  99 
physc  146  1.52  1.40  0.0155  5.91 
urbnpopg  169  2.19  1.75  -1.26  9.14 
fertrt  161  3.05  1.64  0.97  7.67 
intub  169  141.31  1050.66  2.94  1050.66 
ger  168  72  17.70  25.5  114.2 
lie  164  68  10.34  44.5  82.7 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of key variables by level of human development 
   LOW  MEDIUM  HIGH  VERY HIGH 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean 
kgptemp  19  0.00  42  0.10  19  0.36  24  0.84 
Mean   17  25.94  41  22.86  19  11.28  24  11.29 
me  19  15.39  41  4.31  18  0.35  24  0.02 
avgkkz  22  -0.85  69  -0.48  34  0.05  32  1.28 
polity2  22  1.77  62  2.10  34  5.12  29  8.00 
ethnifrac  22  0.72  68  0.47  41  0.39  35  0.26 
pengryc  22  2.03  71  3.31  41  3.36  35  2.07 
hlthexp  22  1.91  71  2.56  40  3.75  34  5.40 
eduexp  19  3.33  57  4.38  34  4.54  31  5.12 
urbnpopg  22  4.41  71  2.57  41  1.13  35  1.28 
imdpt  22  65.73  71  80.68  41  93.90  34  93.89 
physc  22  0.07  61  0.90  30  2.42  33  2.84 
fertrt  22  5.78  68  3.42  37  1.97  34  1.72 
giniadjnoc  14  46.76  48  45.04  29  41.63  28  35.95 
lwheatsugar  14  0.01  48  -0.01  25  0.20  25  0.29 43 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrices  
 
  
Table 3.1: Geography and Human Development Index (n = 99) 
  
   hdi  meantemp  kgptemp  Me 
              
hdi  1          
meantemp  -0.655  1       
kgptemp  0.703  -0.832  1    
me  -0.769  0.502  -0.460  1 
 
Table 3.2: Regional Dummies and Human Development Index (n=169) 
   hdi  regeap  regmena  regsa  regwe  Regssa  reglac 
hdi  1                   
regeap  0.088  1                
regmena  0.126  -0.126  1             
regsa  -0.133  -0.078  -0.070  1          
regwe  0.425  -0.126  -0.112  -0.070  1       
regssa  -0.762  -0.230  -0.205  -0.127  -0.205  1    
reglac  0.176  -0.175  -0.155  -0.097  -0.155  -0.284  1 
 
Table 3.3: Colonial Legacy and Human Development (n=101) 
   hdi  colever  eurfrac  legbritish  legfrench 
                 
hdi  1             
colever  -0.617  1          
eurfrac  0.498  -0.533  1       
legbritish  -0.076  0.189  -0.059  1    
legfrench  -0.202  0.078  0.117  -0.711  1 
 
Table 3.4: Governance, Political Institutions and Human Development (n=142)  
   hdi  avgkkz  va  ps  Ge  rq  Rl  coc  polity2  ethnifrac 
                                
hdi  1                            
avgkkz  0.748  1                         
va  0.652  0.911  1                      
ps  0.553  0.832  0.720  1                   
ge  0.772  0.979  0.873  0.759  1                
rq  0.759  0.959  0.887  0.721  0.953  1             
rl  0.737  0.975  0.831  0.784  0.964  0.921  1          
coc  0.708  0.958  0.814  0.749  0.948  0.892  0.965  1       
polity2  0.340  0.508  0.754  0.386  0.466  0.511  0.387  0.379  1    






Table 3.5: Human Development and Other Conditioning Variables  
   hdi  pengryc  hlthexp  eduexp  fertrt  urbnpopg  imdpt  physc 
                          
hdi  1                      
pengryc  0.03  1                   
hlthexp  0.64  -0.15  1                
eduexp  0.27  -0.25  0.51  1             
fertrt  -0.86  -0.10  -0.52  -0.24  1          
urbnpopg  -0.67  -0.18  -0.43  -0.19  0.76  1       
imdpt  0.65  -0.03  0.44  0.29  -0.70  -0.47  1    
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Appendix 4: BMA Results 
 
Table 4.1:  
Dependent Variable HDI 











Intercept  1.00  "+"  1.00  "+" 
% of population living in KG 
Temperate Zone  0.94  "+"  0.14  "?" 
Mean Temperature  0.22  "-"  0.01  "?" 
Malaria Ecology  0.26  "-"  0.98  "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa  1.00  "-"  0.68  "-" 
South Asia  1.00  "-"  1.00  "-" 
East Asia and Pacific  0.04  "?"  0.02  "?" 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.04  "?"  0.19  "?" 
Western Europe  0.83  "+"  0.01  "?" 
Middle East and North Africa   0.06  "?"  0.01  "?" 
Colony  0.16  "?"  0.05  "?" 
British Colony  0.90  "+"  0.06  "?" 
French Colony  0.09  "?"  0  "?" 
Fraction of people speaking 
any European language  0.17  "?"  0  "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 
   
0.77  "+" 
Polity 2 
   
0.00  "?" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.06  "?" 
Developing Country  
   
1.00  "-" 
Public Expenditure on health 
(% of GDP) 
   
0.05  "?" 
Public Expenditure on 
education  (% of GDP) 
   
0.07  "?" 
Immunization against DPT 
   
0.04  "?" 
Fertility rate 
   
1.00  "-" 
Urbanization rate 
   
0.25  "-" 
Physicians 
   
0.17  "?" 
 
The dependent variable is hdi, the Human Development Index (2005). High values correspond to higher 
levels of Human Development. The numbers reported in the table are the posterior inclusion probabilities 
for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which the variable is 






Table 4.2:  















Intercept  1.00  "+"  1.00  "+" 
% of population living in KG 
Temperate Zone  1.00  "+"  0.02  "?" 
Mean Temperature  0.06  "?"  0.09  "?" 
Malaria Ecology  0.84  "-"  1.00  "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa  1.00  "-"  1.00  "-" 
South Asia  1.00  "-"  1.00  "-" 
East Asia and Pacific  0.10  "?"  0.26  "+" 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.10  "?"  0.02  "?" 
Western Europe  0.99  "+"  0.07  "?" 
Middle East and North Africa   0.11  "?"  0.01  "?" 
Colony  0.06  "?"  0.01  "?" 
British Colony  0.90  "+"  0.23  "+" 
French Colony  0.10  "?"  0.12  "?" 
Fraction of people speaking 
any European language  0.30  "+"  0  "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 
   
0.90  "+" 
Polity 2 
   
0.78  "+" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.00  "?" 
Developing Country  
   
1.00  "-" 
Public Expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
   
0.06  "?" 
Public Expenditure on health  
(% of GDP) 
   
0.06  "?" 
Immunization against DPT 
   
0.99  "+" 
Fertility rate 
   
0.95  "-" 
Urbanization rate 
   
0.59  "-" 
Physicians 
   
0.04  "?" 
Gini (adjusted and averaged 
over 1960-98) 
   
0.12  "?" 
 
 
The dependent variable is hdi, the Human Development Index (2005). High values correspond to higher 
levels of Human Development. The numbers reported in the table are the posterior inclusion probabilities 
for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which the variable is 
included). We also report an indicator of the direction of the relationship. (?) indicates an indeterminate 
sign.  
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Table 4.2:  
Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy (Years) 




probabilities  Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 







Intercept  1.00  "+"  1.00  "+"  1.00  "+" 
% of population living in 
KG Temperate Zone  1.00  "+"  0  "?"  0.06  "?" 
Mean Temperature  0.08  "?"  0.01  "?"  0.07  "?" 
Malaria Ecology  0.73  "-"  0.97  "-"  1.00  "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa  1.00  "-"  0.95  "-"  0.97  "-" 
South Asia  0.26  "-"  0.06  "?"  0.07  "?" 
East Asia and Pacific  0.11  "?"  0.59  "+"  0.94  "+" 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  0.06  "?"  0.03  "?"  0.37  "+" 
Western Europe  0.51  "+"  0.12  "?"  0.02  "?" 
Middle East and North 
Africa   0.07  "?"  0  "?"  0.05  "?" 
Colony  0.05  "?"  0.02  "?"  0.05  "?" 
British Colony  0.06  "?"  0.04  "?"  0.02  "?" 
French Colony  0.06  "?"  0.73  "+"  0.98  "+" 
Fraction of people 
speaking any European 
language  1.00  "+"  0.07  "?"  0.06  "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ 
avg) 
   
0.96  "+"  0  "?" 
Polity 2 
   
0.01  "?"  0.02  "?" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.01  "?"  0.06  "?" 
Public Expenditure on 
health (% of GDP) 
   
0.10  "?"  0.00  "?" 
Incidence of Tuberculosis 
   
1.00  "-"  1.00  "-" 
Immunization against 
DPT 
   
0.09  "?"  0.97  "+" 
Fertility rate 
   
1.00  "-"  1.00  "-" 
Gross Enrolment Ratio 
   
0.48  "+"  0.06  "?" 
Gini (adjusted and 
averaged over 1960-98) 
   
0.02  "?"  0.11  "?" 
Real GDP per capita 
   
    1.00  "+" 
 
The dependent variable is lie, the Life Expectancy (2005). The numbers reported in the table are the 
posterior inclusion probabilities for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models 
in which the variable is included). We also report an indicator of the direction of the relationship. (?) 
indicates an indeterminate relationship.  
 48 
 
Table 4.2:  
Dependent Variable: Combined Gross Enrolment Ratios 




probabilities  Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 







Intercept  1.00  "+"  1.00  "+"  1.00  "+" 
% of population living in KG 
Temperate Zone  1.00  "+"  0.97  "+"  0.99  "+" 
Mean Temperature  0.05  "?"  0.01  "?"  0  "?" 
Malaria Ecology  0.66  "-"  0.96  "-"  0.98  "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa  0.95  "-"  0.39  "-"  0.19  "?" 
South Asia  0.98  "-"  0.37  "-"  0.12  "?" 
East Asia and Pacific  0.15  "?"  0.68  "+"  0.95  "+" 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.51  "+"  0.66  "+"  0.95  "+" 
Western Europe  0.34  "+"  0.16  "?"  0.04  "?" 
Middle East and North Africa   0.09  "?"  0.06  "?"  0.13  "?" 
Colony  0.04  "?"  0  "?"  0  "?" 
British Colony  0.95  "+"  0.35  "+"  0.07  "?" 
French Colony  0.09  "?"  0.05  "?"  0.05  "?" 
Fraction of people speaking 
any European language  0.12  "?"  0.04  "?"  0.01  "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 
   
0.75  "+"  0.08  "?" 
Polity 2 
   
0.93  "+"  0.98  "+" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.09  "?"  0.10  "?" 
Public Expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
   
0.47  "+"  0.36  "+" 
Immunization against DPT 
   
0.6  "+"  0.93  "+" 
Fertility rate 
   
0.16  "?"  0.30  "+" 
Gini (adjusted and averaged 
over 1960-98) 
   
0.00  "?"  0.01  "?" 
Undernourishment rate 
   
0  "?"  0  "?" 
GDP per capita 
   
    0.93  "+" 
 
The dependent variable is ger, the Gross Enrolment Ratios (2005). The numbers reported in the table are 
the posterior inclusion probabilities for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all 
models in which the variable is included). We also report an indicator of the direction of the relationship. 
(?) indicates an indeterminate sign. 
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Table 4.3: OLS Results 
Dependent Variable: HDI 
    Intercept  0.944***  0.862*** 
   (-19.02)  15.29 
% of population living in KG Temperate Zone  -0.062  -0.019 
   (-1.82)  (-0.71) 
Malaria Ecology        -0.004***         -0.004*** 
   (-3.98)  (-4.22) 
Sub Saharan Africa  -0.058  -0.088 
   (-1.18)  (-1.88) 
South Asia  -0.125***  -0.118*** 
   (-4.64)  (-3.84) 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.017  0.006 
   (0.79)  (0.32) 
East Asia and Pacific  0.034  0.030 
   (1.86)  (1.56) 
Western Europe  0.001  0.005 
   (0.05)  (0.27) 
British Colony  0.037*  0.0309 
   (2.07)  (1.61) 
French Colony  0.019  0.016 
   (1.36)  (1.14) 
Governance Index (KKZ avg)  0.043**           0.048*** 
   (2.51)  (2.8) 
Polity 2  0.001  -0.001 
   (-0.91)  (-0.41) 
Developing Country   -0.067**  -0.047* 
   (-2.83)  (-1.98) 
Fertility rate  -0.042***  -0.036*** 
   (-3.64)  (-2.65) 
Urbanization rate  -0.015  -0.012 
   (-1.78)  (-1.35) 
Physicians  0.027  0.018* 
 
(2.39)  (2.02) 
Gini (adjusted and averaged over 1960-98) 
 
0.001 
   
(0.65) 
N  72  62 
Rsquared  0.9524  0.9624 
Numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics computed from 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 








Table 4.4: OLS Results 
Dependent variable: Life Expectancy 
Intercept  71.064***  45.526*** 
   (16.62)  (5.11) 
% of population living in KG Temperate Zone  0.607  0.177 
   (0.4)  (0.13) 
Malaria Ecology  -0.205**  -0.223** 
   (-3.01)  (-3.23) 
Sub Saharan Africa  -3.160  -1.722 
   (-1.6)  (-0.91) 
South Asia  1.094  2.403 
   (0.61)  (1.85) 
Latin America and Caribbean  1.470  1.302 
   (1.27)  (1.28) 
East Asia and Pacific  2.921*  3.057** 
   (2.41)  (3.15) 
Western Europe  2.077*  1.364 
   (1.96)  (1.49) 
British Colony  0.490  -0.343 
   (0.49)  (-0.44) 
French Colony  1.864*  1.253 
   (2.15)  (1.7) 
Governance Index (KKZ avg)  1.470*  0.174 
   (2.12)  (0.2) 
Fertility rate      -1.484***  -0.882* 
   (-3.65)  (-2.28) 
Urbanization rate  0.158  0.209 
   (0.53)  (0.8) 
Immunization rate against DPT  0.034  0.055* 
 
(1.31)  (2.03) 
Incidence of Tuberculosis       -0.022***  -0.022*** 
 
(-4.67)  (-4.34) 
Gross Enrolment Ratio  0.047              0.020 
 
(1.38)  (0.65) 
Gini (adjusted and averaged over 1960-98)  -0.046             -0.020 
 
(-0.89)  (-0.45) 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
 
2.667** 
   
(2.97) 
N  78  78 
Rsquared  0.9631  0.971 
Numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics computed from 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 






Table 4.5: OLS Results 
Dependent variable: Gross Enrolment Ratios 
Intercept  21.938 
   (0.75) 
% of population living in KG Temperate Zone         16.769*** 
   (4.21) 
Malaria Ecology       -0.547*** 
   (-3.61) 
Sub Saharan Africa  -10.456* 
   (-2.01) 
South Asia  -7.622 
   (-1.14) 
Latin America and Caribbean  6.086 
   (1.72) 
East Asia and Pacific  8.125* 
   (2.26) 
Western Europe  3.703 
   (1.35) 
British Colony  5.331* 
   (2.02) 
French Colony  3.056 
   (1.35) 
Governance Index (KKZ avg)  1.885 
   (0.87) 
Polity 2           0.636*** 
   (4.7) 
Fertility rate  2.633 
   (1.72) 
Urbanization rate  -0.144 
   (-0.15) 
Immunization rate against DPT       0.203** 
 
(2.86) 
Public Expenditure on education (% of GDP)  0.656 
 
(1.08) 
Undernourishment rate  0.048 
 
(0.41) 
Log of Real GDP per capita  1.577 
 
(0.58) 
N  66 
Rsquared  0.9177 
    Numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics computed from heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors 
* p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001 
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